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Spain has made considerable efforts to democratize1 its intelligence agencies
since Francisco Franco’s dictatorship ended in 1975 and the country’s
transition to democracy began. The existing literature, both in Spanish and
English, on those reforms can now be supplemented by analyses of the
ongoing efforts to achieve a balance, or tradeoff, between democratic civilian
control and the effectiveness of intelligence.2
Like many other established and developing democracies around the
world, Spain faces serious problems of terrorism and illegal migration, as well
as organized and street crime. While these challenges derive from diverse
sources, they represent, singly and together, a threat to Spanish stability,
prosperity, and democratic development. As the train bombings in Madrid in
2004 made horrifically clear, this threat can be grave. As such, Spain needs
very effective intelligence agencies as its first line of defense to thwart
incidents before they materialize.
Effective intelligence, in turn, involves secrecy and intrusive practices,
which challenge the democratic principles of transparency, accountability,
and personal freedom. In this context, if democracies lack a rigorous ethical
context for their intelligence agencies, including a robust legal framework and
effective oversight mechanisms to act as checks and balances, the danger
always exists, especially in new democracies, that the intelligence agencies will
overshadow the political process. Accountable governance, civil liberties, or,
in the most extreme cases, the country’s very democracy could then be
severely constrained. Since Franco’s dictatorship was supported by an
increasingly oppressive intelligence apparatus such considerations are not
academic abstractions or doom-saying.
More than four decades have elapsed since the start of Spain’s transition to
democracy. During that time it has developed democratic and effective
intelligence agencies.3 Madrid’s post-Franco Intelligence Community (IC) has
developed as a profession,4 and its expertise and corporate ethos have evolved.
As a result, Spain’s intelligence agencies have become effective in countering
the nation’s security threats. Yet they still lack robust formal oversight amid
sporadic or hesitant civilian interest. This crucial lacuna means that the
Spanish IC may be stymied in its democratic progress, thereby having real
implications for its continued operational and organizational success.
As both a symptom and cause of this lingering imbalance, the ethical aspect
of the profession continues to be precarious. For example, Spain’s National
Intelligence Center (CNI) has a Code of Ethics, borrowed from the military,
that continues to exert a clear influence on the structure, worldview, and
collective personality of the agency.5 Thus, no legal procedure exists by which
a CNI officer who discovers unethical or unprofessional behavior within the
agency can report it through channels.6 The police, too, lack robust ethical
safeguards. Minimal ethical standards have fueled occasional episodes of
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corruption and politicized practices (for example, illegal spying on political
opponents) among police intelligence officers.7 These occasional incidents have
been aggravated by the continuation of abusive Franco-era practices by police
officers and agencies working too closely with the politicians.8
THE LEGACY OF ILLIBERAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
Franco’s long dictatorship, from 1936 to 1975, was an authoritarian regime
characterized by extreme violence, especially in the aftermath of the Civil War
(1936–1939), suppression, censorship, and other human rights abuses against
Spanish citizens.9 General Franco earned his authority from his victory in the
Civil War. He garnered legitimacy from the Roman Catholic Church elites
and the National Movement (Movimiento Nacional) backed by the only
acknowledged political party, Falange Espa~nola. He ensured the security of
his regime with the support of the armed forces, the Nacional Police, and the
Civil Guard. Franco was Spain’s head of state (for life, from 194710) as well
as head of government, until the appointment of Admiral Carrero Blanco in
June 1973.
During his nearly forty-year rule, Franco forbade opposition political
parties, abolished free elections, and restricted liberties and freedoms that had
already been achieved in the 1931 Constitution.11 Democratic civilian control
of the military or the intelligence agencies was non-existent. Instead, Franco
personally supervised the armed forces, in conjunction with three different
ministries—Army, Navy and Air Force—staffed exclusively by military
personnel. Franco ruthlessly prevented the creation of any opposition power
base in order to consolidate his authority and rule.12 Franco also isolated both
Spain and its military from the then-developing zeitgeist of democratization in
post–World War II Europe, leaving membership in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) or integration in the European Community (EC) out of
the question. Scattered efforts toward a somewhat limited integration into
Europe and the rest of the world included the 1953 agreements on military
bases and installations with the United States, followed by the 1953 Concordat
with the Catholic Church, accession to the United Nations in 1955 (although
Spain continued to be viewed as an outcast by many nations until the 1970s),
and a preferential agreement with the EC in 1970.13
At home, in 1968, Franco created the National Countersubversive
Organization (OCN), comprised mainly of military officers.14 The OCN spied
on real or imaginary “enemies” of the Francoist regime, in particular
university students.15 The OCN was, in other words, Franco’s political
police.16 “It achieved immense power … and began operations to infiltrate
the academic world, labour organizations and religious circles to neutralize
dissent without exercising repressive police measures.”17 In 1972, the OCN
became the Central Service of Documentation (SECED) within the military
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High Command.18 SECED continued the OCN’s domestic espionage
practices.19 Spain’s geographically and topically limited foreign intelligence,
as well as a great deal of domestic spying, was conducted by the Military
High Command, which spent more time monitoring Republicans, Catalans,
Basques, and anarchists living in exile in France, Belgium, Argentina, and
Mexico than it did checking in on developments in the Sahara or gauging the
opinion of the Franco regime in other European polities.20
OCN/SECED helped Franco establish concentration camps, implement
forced labor, and carry out extra-judicial executions, actions which resulted in
up to 400,000 deaths.21 In sum, under Franco, Spain became a surveillance
state. Its repressive dictatorship combined the psychological fear used by the
Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, with the physical abuses
practiced by Latin America’s military dictatorships. In this sense, it was the
worst of both worlds.
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TODAY
Franco’s death in November 1975 ended the dictatorship, allowed the return
of the monarchy under King Juan Carlos, and paved the way for democracy.
Spain’s transition to democracy was a negotiation—reforma pactada, ruptura
pactada—whereby the old regime and opposition moderates initially crafted a
reformed government. Their negotiations ultimately led to a purposeful
rupture with the past, including a weeding out of the nondemocratic elements
of the Franco dictatorship, and the establishment of democratic structures.22
Since then, civilian government officials, especially those in the executive
branch, have endeavored to democratize the intelligence agencies, seeking to
make them both effective and under civilian control.
Roles, Missions, and Legal Basis
After a succession of reforms, Spain’s IC currently comprises the following
agencies: the National Intelligence Center (CNI) under the Ministry of
Presidency; the General Commissariat for Intelligence (CGI) of the Spanish
National Police; the Technological Investigation Brigade (BIT) of the Spanish
National Police; the Civil Guard Intelligence Service (SIGC) under the
Ministry of Interior; and some regional police intelligence units, within the
regional Departments of the Interior; the Center of Intelligence of the Armed
Forces (CIFAS), the Army, Navy, and Air Force Intelligence Services, and
Tactical Intelligence Units, all under the Ministry of Defense; the Customs
Surveillance Service (SVA) and the Financial Intelligence Unit (SEPBLAC)
under the Ministry of Economy; and, diplomatic intelligence functions within
the country’s overseas embassies.23 Figure 1 illustrates this array of agencies
and their mutual relationships.
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The activities of Spain’s IC are coordinated by the CNI through the
Government Delegate Commission for Intelligence Affairs—a body akin to
the National Security Council in the United States—chaired by the Deputy
Prime Minister.24 All Spanish intelligence agencies also cooperate and
collaborate both bilaterally and multilaterally with their counterparts
throughout the world.
The Ministry of the Presidency Intelligence: The National Intelligence
Center. The National Intelligence Center, Spain’s principal intelligence
agency, was established in May 2002 by Act 11 (and amplified by several
succeeding laws and Royal Decrees). It replaced the scandal-plagued agency
begun in the early years of the democratic transition. An all-source agency, its
main purpose is to “provide the Prime Minister and the Government of Spain
with information, analysis, studies or proposals that enable the prevention
and avoidance of any danger, threat or aggression against the independence
or territorial integrity of Spain, its national interests and the stability of its
institutions and the rule of law.”25
Numbering some 3,500 personnel,26 the CNI includes a Directorship, a
General Secretariat, and three Directorates (Operations, Analysis, and
Resources); additional bodies supporting the CNI Director (i.e., the Offices of
the Secretary of State-Director and the Legal Consultancy); as well as
additional components throughout Spain and abroad.27
The CNI carries out its roles and missions in line with the Intelligence
Directive and in direct coordination with the rest of the country’s intelligence
Figure 1. Spain’s intelligence community.
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and security institutions, through the Government Delegate Commission for
Intelligence Affairs. The Center has an annual secret budget, as stipulated by
Act 11/95 of 11 March on the use and control of confidential funds.28 The
CNI is the government’s designated counterintelligence agency, as well as the
service responsible for the safeguarding of classified information29 and
information security through the National Cryptologic Center (CCN).30 It is
also charged with vetting refugees, a task it shares with the Intelligence
Center for Terrorism and Organized Crime (CITCO), which organizationally
resides in the Ministry of the Interior.31
Ministry of Interior Intelligence: Spanish National Police Intelligence
Agencies and Civil Guard Intelligence Agency. The General Commissariat
for Intelligence (CGI) was established by Royal Decree No. 400/2012.32 The
CGI provides intelligence and conducts operations related to public
security.33 Toward this end, “its main roles and missions involve the
collection, reception, treatment and development of intelligence of interest for
public order and security within the scope of the functions of the General
Directorate, as well as its exploitation or operational exploitation, especially
in the area of counter-terrorism, that is to be done both nationally and
internationally.”34 The Technological Investigation Brigade, created in 2002,
specializes in such areas as the surveillance of social networks; averting cyber
crime and terrorism; preventing child pornography and ensuring the
protection of minors; and safeguarding intellectual and industrial property.35
In addition, the Ministry of Interior houses the CITCO, created by Royal
Decree No. 873/201436 as an analytical fusion center focused on fighting
crime and terrorism.37 Merging two existing fusion centers: the Intelligence
Center for Organized Crime, established in May 2006, and the National
Center for Anti-Terrorist Coordination, September 2004,38 its approximately
200 personnel are drawn from the National Police and Civil Guard, the
Prisons Authority, a unit from the CNI, and one from the customs service.
The CITCO hosts the Investigation Coordination System (“SCI-Sicoa”),
which is a database shared by the CNI, Civil Guard, and National Police.39
CITCO also has an external role. It participates in the Europol’s European
Union Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), European
Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT), and the
international coalition against the Islamic State (ISIS). It also participates in
several EU security-focused working groups, and in the Global
Counterterrorism Forum, led by Europe.40
In addition, three of Spain’s 17 regions have their own police forces: the
Catalonian Mossos D!Esquadra, Basque Ertzaintza, and Navarran Policia
Foral Navarra. These regional forces operate their own intelligence units.41
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The Civil Guard Intelligence Service (SIGC) is the Civil Guard’s
intelligence agency. The Civil Guard, a paramilitary police force, operates
under the umbrella of both the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of
Defense. The SIGC was created in February 1941 as part of the Second
Section of the General Staff. Today, it belongs to the Civil Guard’s
Operative Direction, providing intelligence and conducting operations
pertaining to the public security.42 Its roles and missions involve fighting
terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, cyber crime, and cyber
terrorism. While the Civil Guard is tasked primarily with patrolling and
conducting crime-related investigations in the country’s rural areas,43 the
SIGC has branches in Madrid, as well as throughout the country and
abroad, traditionally in France (because of separatist-related terrorism44)
and increasingly in Northern Africa.
Military Intelligence: Center of Intelligence of the Armed Forces, the
individual Army, Navy, and Air Force Intelligence Services, and Tactical
Intelligence Units. The Center of Intelligence of the Armed Forces
(CIFAS), created in June 2004 by Royal Decree No. 1551, is Spain’s main
military intelligence agency, functioning within the General Defense Staff
(EMAD). The CIFAS is an all-source agency whose main roles are to
coordinate and guide the overall military intelligence efforts; develop
strategic intelligence for the EMAD and the rest of the armed forces; alert
policymakers to potential crises; and establish connections to national and
international counterparts.45
The individual Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence services carry out
operational and tactical military intelligence activities. All are part of Spain’s
Intelligence System of the Armed Forces (SIFAS) which thereby integrates
the separate intelligence capabilities of the Spanish armed forces and
EMAD.46 Under the SIFAS, all military intelligence agencies carry out their
activities based on a Joint Military Intelligence Plan developed by EMAD in
conjunction with the General Staffs of the several services.47 The SIFAS
collaborates with and provides intelligence to all state agencies (based on the
“need to know” principle), with Spain’s various allies and partner nations, as
well as with NATO and the European Union.48 SIFAS also conducts military
counterintelligence activities.49
Other Ministerial Intelligence Agencies. Several other ministries have
created intelligence agencies to serve their specific needs and purposes. For
instance, the Ministry of Economy set up two intelligence agencies. The
Customs Surveillance Service, established by Law No. 66/1997, is charged
with the investigation and prosecution of cases involving contraband, illegal
drugs, financial evasion and violations, money laundering, and the carrying
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out of financial related surveillance. The Financial Intelligence Unit was
established by Royal Decree No. 304/2014, in accordance with Law No. 10 of
April 2010. This unit coordinates all financial intelligence related efforts
within Spain and works to prevent money laundering and terrorism
financing.50
Spanish embassies abroad also have diplomatic intelligence structures.51
FRAMEWORK OF CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT
As part of the democratization of Spain’s intelligence apparatus, several
layers of control and oversight were codified.
Executive Control
Executive control of Spain’s intelligence agencies involves direction and
guidance by the Deputy Prime Minister and the CNI Director. The
government’s Delegated Committee for Intelligence Affairs, established in
2002 by the CNI Law, coordinates all intelligence-related activities.52 The
Intelligence Directive, which is approved yearly, sets the intelligence priorities
for the CNI.53 Executive control of intelligence, complemented by the
National Defense Council (CDN) and created by the Organic Law on
National Defense of November 2005, advises the Prime Minister on defense
matters and sets the country’s strategic priorities.54 Also playing a role are the
various ministries that include intelligence services.
Legislative Oversight
Legislative control and oversight of intelligence is exercised by the Defense
Committee of the Congress of Deputies, established by the CNI Law.55 The
Committee has the following powers: managing the allocation of confidential
funds for CNI, as established by the government; preparing a yearly report
on the CNI’s activities; and conducting hearings regarding the CNI’s
leadership.56
Judicial Review
Judicial control of Spanish intelligence, established by the CNI Law of 2002,
requires that authorization for intrusive intelligence activities be granted by a
judge of the Supreme Court.57 The CNI’s director must officially request
prior approval of any invasive measures to be undertaken by the agency and
precisely detail the nature and objective of the search, surveillance, or seizure;
the reasons and circumstances leading to the request for such actions; and
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any additional information on the affected person or persons, if known, and
the location of the proposed activities.58
Informal Oversight
Apart from the formal government oversight mechanisms, Spain’s media and
civil society have exercised informal oversight over the intelligence agencies.
The media have assumed the role of watchdog or “fire alarm,” fulfilling their
fourth-estate obligations to an informed democratic polity. A study
conducted by Antonio Diaz Fernandez shows how “89 percent of the
parliamentary questions put by deputies concerning illegal or illegitimate acts
of the Spanish intelligence services are based on items reported in the press,”
including the scandals of the 1990s that inspired some of the more recent
rounds of reform in and of the IC.59
GETTING THIS FAR: DEMOCRATIC REFORM OF INTELLIGENCE
Spain’s policymakers have reformed the post-Franco intelligence agencies
with two goals in mind. First, they sought to obliterate the services’ stigma
of oppression and illiberalism and to develop a new IC, working in the
service of democracy, that differed significantly from the nefarious OCN/
CESED. To this end, in 1977, Vice-President Guti!errez Mellado, a four-
star Army general, created the Superior Defense Information Center
(CESID). His express purpose was to initiate “a new intelligence service
that would break with the methods of espionage associated with the days
of Franco and would become a staunch ally in the difficult transition to
democracy, still in its early days.”60
Spain’s civilian elites then sought to develop intelligence agencies able to
tackle the nation’s complex and dynamic security context, involving such
issues as illegal migration, organized crime, and, most importantly,
terrorism.61 Domestic terrorist organizations that have long been active in
Spain include the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA), the First of
October Antifascist Resistance Groups (GRAPO), the Basque-Spanish
Battalion, and the Antiterrorist Liberation Groups (GAL).62 Today, Spain
remains at counter-terrorism security “Level 4” (on a scale of one to five),63
with a “high risk,” due to the ongoing developments in the security context,
including the attacks by Islamist extremists in Europe and North Africa. Such
threats call for qualified intelligence agencies, able to “promote growth and
innovation, protect against criminal actions, understand the unbalanced
markets, and help control against speculative actions and the increased loss of
sovereignty in economic affairs.”64
Reform has progressed through four stages: 1975–1981; 1981–2002;
2002–2004; and 2004–present. These stages are bracketed by specific events or
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developments that give them their distinctive characteristics, including the
attempted military coup in 1981, the CNI Law of 2002, and the terrorist
attacks in Madrid in 2004.
1975–1981: Interest in Intelligence Meets the Legacy of the Past
In the aftermath of the country’s transition to democracy, policymakers in
Madrid had interest in creating new, democratic, intelligence agencies. Yet,
the Franco regime’s strong legacy considerably hindered their efforts to bring
about a tradeoff between intelligence effectiveness and democratic civilian
control. In this context was the CESID created, following Royal Decree No.
1558 of 1977, which established the structure of the new democratic
government.65 During its first years of activity, the CESID encompassed
three divisions—domestic intelligence; external intelligence; and the technical
affairs division, which included electronic surveillance. It lacked a centralized
headquarters.66 In the mid-1980s, CESID started to develop its foreign
intelligence capabilities—focused mostly on Mediterranean basin security,
North Africa, and the Middle East—and to establish ties with such foreign
intelligence counterparts as NATO, especially with France and Italy, and in
Northern Africa (Morocco).67 This achievement was especially notable, given
Spain’s isolation from the world during the Franco era. It also marked the
CESID’s clear shift to the conventional role of a borders-out intelligence
agency in a democracy.
The CESID had no role in law enforcement, representing a clear step
toward a post-Francoist and democratically-minded intelligence order that
institutionalized such divisions of authority and operations.68
Yet, the newly created CESID retained many of the Franco regime’s
military and police personnel who attempted to continue such practices as
illegally spying on political parties. The Prime Minister himself, Adolfo
Su!arez, then personally explained to the Center that such practices are
nondemocratic and ordered its leaders to close down their wiretapping
devices.69 Initially, the CESID was staffed exclusively with military personnel,
another dark continuity from Francoism. Finally, some five years after its
creation, the service started to recruit civilians.70 Nevertheless, the
appointment of its first civilian director took 24 years, when Ambassador
Jorge Dezcallar was given the task of transforming the CESID into
the CNI.71
The legacy of the past also involved turf wars and resistance to change on
the part of the nation’s main law enforcement agencies—the Civil Guard and
the National Police—which did not want the CESID to play a bigger role
within the new intelligence system.72 The result was a chronic lack of
coordination and cooperation between the new CNI and the other agencies,
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as well as an over-concentration of power in the law enforcement agencies’
intelligence units.
The civilian elites’ main goal during the transition was to secure the loyalty
of the armed forces to democracy. Remnants of the old system in leadership
positions grudgingly went along with the reforms in return for a quid pro quo
of guarantees, such as maintaining Francoist personnel in the intelligence
agencies, thereby hindering democratic civilian control.73 In this context,
“[s]ome veteran specialists were reclassified or given new duties, the hierarchy
was shuffled here and there…”74 In sum, not very much changed during the
transition to democracy.
These many hurdles made for marginal reforms at best, resulting in a
limited effectiveness in fighting terrorism and virtually no oversight.75
Consequently, the CESID’s “first years were complicated by a lack of clarity
regarding the mission it should follow, scarce resources, and the ineptitude of
its directors who were not entirely convinced that keeping an eye on the more
reactionary members of the military was meant to figure among their
duties.”76 Ultimately, as Jose A. Olmeda noted,
the information-gathering mechanisms which are of critical importance
in the fight against terrorism were not only inadequate but frequently
fairly crude, and operated with little if any type of governmental
controls. A total lack of coordination between the intelligence arms
answerable to the various state security services was self-evident,
indeed, notorious.77
Under such circumstances, any successful (yet limited) operations in
combatting terrorism occurred mostly at the local or provincial level,
prompting the government to seek outside support for counterterrorism
intelligence.78 The erratic and perfunctory reforms permitted the continued
mistreatment of inhabitants of the Basque Province by intelligence agents
who relied on Franco-era methods.79
By 1981, the incremental institutionalization of civilian supremacy, along
with political instability and infighting during the transition, antagonized the
military leadership. Several other developments during the transitional period
helped perpetuate hostility toward democracy throughout the military,
among them the legalization of the Communist Party; economic problems,
such as high inflation and high government spending and depleted foreign
reserves; the granting of autonomy to some regions; the emergence of
nationalistic journalism; and the escalation of terrorist activities by the
nationalist and separatist ETA group, which often targeted the military and
the Civil Guard.80
This hostility led to an attempted coup by certain elements of the Military
and the Civil Guard81 on 23 February 1981, when nearly 300 armed troops
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under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina seized the
Chamber of Deputies within the Palace of Congress. They held the deputies,
as well as the Prime Minister and cabinet members, hostage for several hours.
Simultaneously, the head of the III Military Region, Lieutenant General
Jaime Milans del Bosch, seized power, releasing a decree that militarized all
the civilian officials, imposing military jurisdiction and martial law, and
banning strikes and political activities. The authors of the coup wanted to
make General Alfonso Armada president of the new government.82 The coup
failed within 24hours, but only after King Juan Carlos, as commander-in-
chief of the armed forces, condemned the uprising and clearly supported
democracy.83
1981–2002: Reactive and Perfunctory Intelligence Reforms—
Scandals, Leaks, and Meager Oversight
The 1981 failed coup triggered several reforms of CESID, the police, and the
Civil Guard. A first step was the ousting of military officers from
the successor government. To this end, a new military penal code was
formulated to preclude the military’s involvement in politics through such
measures as granting the civil courts jurisdiction to try cases of military
rebellion against the constitution.84 But even this reassertion of democratic
civil–military relations came couched as something of a compromise with the
military authorities. For one thing, the new military code was not enacted
until 1985. For another, the Law for the Defense of the Constitution, enacted
in 1981, granted the military a role in fighting Basque terrorism.85
A second step was to allow the coup organizers to be tried first in military
courts, then in civilian courts following a government appeal, which led to the
imprisonment of the key hard-liners. The military eventually understood that
Spain’s path to democracy, and civilian supremacy over the military, were
irrevocable, and its leaders began to contemplate ways and means to be part
of the new system.86
In the aftermath of the coup, Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo appointed
General Alonso Manglano as director of CESID. Manglano started a robust
process of modernization and professionalization in transformation of the
agency.87 He assigned such new roles to the CESID as barracks surveillance
and foreign intelligence. In addition, the CESID became a co-located agency:
functionally, housed within the Ministry of Presidency, and, organizationally,
under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defense. As Gim!enez-Salinas notes, for
CESID “the coup d’!etat of 1981 made a break with the past: CESID clarified
its mandate in order to detect conspiracies to the democratic transition,
changed its image and did succeed in detecting a planned coup d’!etat in
October 1982.”88
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Additional post-coup reforms included increased deployment of police and
Civil Guard special operations and antiterrorist units throughout the Basque
country, as well as attempts to strengthen interagency intelligence and law
enforcement cooperation and coordination, especially in the field of
combating terrorism.89 In the mid-1980s, the President created an interagency
coordination body at the Moncloa palace (the location of the Prime Minister’s
Office), comprised of some six representatives (two from each agency) of the
Civil Guard, Police, and the CESID, which functioned only very briefly due to
push-back from the agencies.90 The initial results of these endeavors were,
hence, rather modest. The antiterrorist coordination bodies continued to
operate, yet they were plagued by institutional rivalries and disagreements.91
Until after the 1990s, when various scandals involving the intelligence
agencies surfaced and triggered the interest of the legislative branch in
intelligence, there was no democratic civilian control of intelligence in Spain.
The institutions existed on paper, but the civilian leadership did not exercise
much oversight in practice; the military men retained some power in
intelligence matters, and the politicians tended to lack the interest or expertise
to step in—at least until the intelligence agencies became front-page news.
One of these scandals occurred in 1992, when a congressional investigation
found cases of corruption within the socialist government, linked to the
intelligence agencies, that involved the unlawful use of secret funds, including
using secret funds for the dirty war against ETA.92 Another scandal occurred
in 1995, when a CESID officer, Juan Alberto Perote, head of the CESID’s
operations, illegally removed 1200 CESID documents from the Center and
leaked information to the press, which revealed the socialist government’s
“dirty war” on ETA, as well as the agency’s spying on businessmen,
journalists, and other civilian elites, including the King.93 This incident,
dubbed as the Caso Perote, stirred up a firestorm in the media as well as
within the Spanish government, and led to the resignation of the Vice
President, the Minister of Defense, and the Director of CESID.94 Another
scandal occurred in 1998, when media revelations exposed the CESID’s
spying on Herri Batasuna, the political arm of the terrorist group ETA, at
that time already a legal political party.95
Such scandals led to several CESID reforms after 1995, including the
creation of a general secretariat within the CESID to ensure the proper
management of the service and the establishment of a security unit to ensure
the protection of the CESID’s personnel and its assets, with the view of
deterring any future leaks akin to Caso Perote.96 In order to prevent the
CESID’s going rogue, then–Minister of Defense Eduardo Serra even
forwarded to the Council of Ministers, for the first time ever, a list of
objectives for CESID that would bring the agency more clearly in line with
the norms and roles of established democratic intelligence. Serra requested
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the council’s approval of the objectives, but he never received it, as none of
the ministers wanted to be associated with intelligence issues.97
In 1995 Royal Decree No. 1324/1995 was issued on the CESID Personnel
Statute, which “established common rules for all employees of CESID
without making any distinction about their origins” and stipulated that the
“term of office of the CESID’s director general shall not exceed five years” to
prevent scandals and wrongdoing that, in the past, had grown at least
partially out of the extended tenure of its directors general.98
Nevertheless, democratic civilian control and oversight remained
deficient. Executive direction of the CESID consisted of informal
relationships between Minister of Defense Narc!ıs Serra and CESID
director Alonso Manglano rather than following a set of established
producer–consumer practices. Legislative oversight was hampered by the
legislative committee’s lack of authority, expertise, and interest in
intelligence matters, as well as political games.99 A particular challenge to
effective legislative oversight has been gaining access to information.100
Despite the legal101 right to require/acquire information and support from
the IC, granted to the Parliament by both the Spanish Constitution and
the Law of Official Secrets 9/1969, as modified by Law 48/1978, Parliament
was (and still is) seldom able to receive data from the agencies—
paradoxically, also due to the Law of Official Secrets.102 That law not only
makes impossible the declassification of documents, but has also been
invoked by the IC as a pretext for refusing the legislative branch access to
information. In the mid-2010s, Spain’s Congress developed a proposal,
initiated by the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), and supported by the
Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE), Podemos, and other parties, to declassify
documents that are at least 25 years old, or 35 in some exceptional cases.
The Conservative Party (PP) voted against modification of the current Law
(of 1969) even though members agreed that some change is necessary.103
As a result, lawmakers’ attempts at oversight involved seeking information
and conducting inquiries based mainly on rumors and media leaks.104 After
numerous failed attempts to mitigate this obstacle to effective oversight,
the legislature on 2 June 1992 adopted a new resolution on the disclosure
of official secrets to legislators—but to no avail.105 As noted by Jose-Miguel
Palacios, access to classified information remains “difficult in Spain.
According to the Official Secrets Law, declassification requires a specific
decision by the Council of Ministers or, for military matters, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.”106
One particular endeavor involved the enactment of Law No. 11 of May
1995 on the handling of secret funds. The Law set up a special legislative
committee to control the secret budget.107 But this committee on secret funds
was far from effective; the members seemed more interested in political games
and gains than with oversight. Their activity seemed to involve constant
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leaking to the media, thereby increasing the CESID’s hostility toward the
committee. The CESID refused outright to provide information with regard
to how the secret funds were used.108
Judicial control was also ineffective. Most of the time, the secret agencies
conducted invasive surveillance without requesting or receiving a warrant
from the High Court.109 Moreover, when the High Court attempted to
conduct an investigation into the wiretapping of the King and other state
authorities in the 1990s, the CESID refused to grant the agency access to
classified information.110 On 11 May 2004, the legislature adopted a new
resolution allowing the committee on secret funds to include more members,
allowing a broader number of legislators to access classified information,
among them members of the minority groups in the Congress.111 Yet, the two
main political parties can continue to veto the presence on the committee of
any group on grounds of loyalty or suspicion.112
2002–2004: More Reforms, the 3/11 Strategic Surprise, and the
Advent of an Intelligence Culture
Not until May 2002, however, did the government more seriously undertake
intelligence reform. In the aftermath of the scandals of the 1990s, the
President replaced the CESID with the National Intelligence Center (CNI).
The government gave the CNI a firm legal basis, through the CNI Law, and
began a process of modernization aimed at increasing the service’s flexibility
and capability to adjust to the dynamic post–11 September 2001 (9/11)
security context and to recruit new personnel with contemporary skills.113
The Law also established legislative and judicial oversight of the CNI,
including the funding-focused committee.114 But the 2002 CNI Law did not
stipulate oversight of the activities of the other intelligence agencies.
Then, on 11 March 2004 (3/11), Spain suffered a gruesome terrorist attack
in Madrid, with the explosion of 10 bombs in four different locations, killing
193 people and wounding 1858 others. The 3/11 attack was a strategic
surprise115 for the Spanish intelligence agencies. There were at least two
reasons for the intelligence community’s failure to anticipate and prevent the
attack: the agencies’ flawed collection and analysis practices had led to
“inadequate and incorrect intelligence assessment;”116 and “internal tensions
among different departments, mainly jurisdictional fights among different
parts of the Spanish government bureaucracy,”117 hindered the sharing and
dissemination of relevant intelligence.118
In other words, the brutal 3/11 terrorist attacks in Madrid confirmed that
the reform process had not yet achieved a tradeoff between democratic
civilian control and effectiveness. This situation was reflected in the paltry
scholarly research on Spanish intelligence. For many years, scholarly
intelligence- and military-related research was a taboo, partly self-imposed,
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partly security forces–imposed. This attitude was due largely to the stigma
associated with intelligence in Spain, which, in turn, admittedly aroused
scholars’ loathing toward the military and intelligence. In addition, the
closed nature of the military and intelligence agencies, exacerbated by the
overbearing secrecy that prevailed at this time, further discouraged scholarly
attention to intelligence affairs. As a result, academic literature on intelligence
in Spain was scarce until the early 2000s.119
Since then, interest in researching intelligence has increased. Public debates
have occurred between scholars and intelligence and military figures. This
period has also witnessed the advent of joint courses featuring intelligence
practitioners and interested outsiders, as well as the first domestic academic
publications dedicated to Spanish intelligence. Another particularly positive
development of the early 2000s was the blossoming of a new national
intelligence culture.120
Two factors made this change possible: Spain’s NATO missions, which
kindled public attention to the country’s military and intelligence matters,
and the strategic leadership of the then–CNI Director Jorge Dezcallar, who
wanted to build linkages between the intelligence community and the public.
Ruben Arcos has noted that, at that moment, “Spain’s full membership in
NATO and its participation in peace-keeping missions awakened academic
interest in security and helped toward a change in the perception of those
who devoted their time to studying these matters,” while the CNI Director
“set up a small group … in his Secretariat responsible for building bridges
with different academic, social, political and economic circles.”121
2004–Present: Intelligence Transformation, Effectiveness, and an
Advanced Intelligence Culture
Since the terrorist attacks in 2004, Spain’s IC has undergone a more robust
reform. The civilian authorities have become more interested in boosting the
agencies’ effectiveness in fighting terrorism, while also strengthening oversight
and advancing the intelligence culture. A recent Intelligence Directive set the
guidance for the service, though the exact text remains secret.
In 2016, the government announced that it would allocate “60
million euros … during future fiscal years, beyond 2016, to
modernize … CNI … with the goal of making it possible for the intelligence
services to enter into contracts for technological renewal and infrastructure
investment.”122 In addition, some “500 more spies” are expected to join “La
Casa” by 2020.123 Besides hiring university graduates in political science,
international relations, history, cultures, and languages (especially Arabic),124
the CNI has increasingly recruited “mathematicians, computer scientists, and
telecoms engineers, precisely in order to modernize research systems,
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technology, analysis and management, and information search, as well as the
cyber protection of critical infrastructures and information.”125
Spanish civilian elites also have undertaken to boost intelligence
cooperation and sharing, both domestically and internationally. Since the
early 2000s, for instance, “[t]here has been a smooth exchange of information
between the state security services and the CNI.”126 The CNI and the CIFAS,
for example, have reportedly been improving their interagency coordination
and cooperation.127 The CNI, the National Center for the Protection of
Critical Infrastructures (CNPIC)—an Interior Ministry agency linked to
CNI—the CNI’s CCN, and the National Institute of Communication
Technologies (INTECO) of the Ministry of Industry and Energy have been
working together to avert and mitigate cyber attacks.128 In addition, the Joint
Cyber Command was created in 2013 under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in line
with NATO’s recommendation “to plan and execute military cyber defense
operations in the armed forces’ networks and information and
telecommunication systems … to contribute to the appropriate response in
cyber space to threats or attacks having a potential impact on
national defense.”129
Also significant was the creation of CITCO, making Spain the only
country that “every month reports on the execution of counterterrorist
operations in the working group of the Council of Europe [as received],”
where states assess and exchange experiences on the jihadist threat. Thus, at
each meeting held in Brussels, the CITCO representatives report “incidents,”
which at present is tantamount to saying successes, “something unmatched by
the security services of any other EU member state.”130
The city of Barcelona has become a major hub for intelligence agencies
from countries having diplomatic ties with Spain that are threatened by
international terrorism because Catalonia is one of the principal harbors of
jihadism in Europe due to “the high number of legal and clandestine
immigrants from North Africa.”131 As such, intelligence agencies from all
over the world now operate in Barcelona to “monitor and infiltrate the
Muslim communities where radical Islamists—those who live in Spain as well
as those who are just passing through Barcelona under the aegis and
protection of residents—are suspected to be hidden.”132
UNEVEN PROGRESS: CHALLENGES
These many efforts have had the desired outcome: boosting intelligence
effectiveness. Spain’s intelligence community has been more effective in
preventing and averting terrorism and organized crime threats, both
domestically and abroad. In this context, the Spanish Police, Civil Guard,
CNI, as well as regional police forces (including those in Catalonia, Basque
Country, and Navarra), have strengthened their anti-terrorism cooperation,
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particularly with regard to conducting preventive surveillance of individuals
suspected of terrorism, and venues that are either possible targets or meeting
places for alleged terrorists.133 Spain’s modification of the Criminal Code
under Law 2/2015 allows law enforcement agencies to make arrests at the
very early stages of a potential terrorist attack.134 According to the CITCO’s
leadership, “It is not necessary to wait until a terrorist has explosives in their
[sic] hands. They can be arrested before and absolutely all those arrested are
in custody.”135
Several cases of intelligence effectiveness in the fight against terrorism and
organized crime stand out. In 2008, Spanish intelligence effectively averted a
domestic terrorist attempt by Islamic extremists before a planned visit to
Europe by then-Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Spain then notified other
European countries that they might be targeted as well.136 Effective intelligence
analysis has been key to the success of various operations against organized
crime, including operations Avispa (Wasp), Troika, and Aikon in July 2015
against the Russian–Georgian mafias, and operation Emperador (Emperor) in
Madrid in 2012 against the Chinese mafia.137 In May 2016, excellent intelligence
sharing and cooperation, both domestically and internationally, made possible
the release and return to Madrid of three Spanish freelance journalists who had
been held hostage for ten months in Aleppo, Syria, by the Al-Nusra Front
terrorist group, associated with al-Qaeda.138
In June 2016, surveillance in Alicante led to the arrest of several terrorist
suspects. Spanish security forces stress that such operations are very
challenging because jihadists try to blend in as Western tourists and
deliberately choose to operate in high-profile places like the Alicante, which
are visited by hundreds of thousands of tourists annually. These plots test the
capability of intelligence agencies to identify the real terrorists.139 In July
2016, the Civil Guard arrested two Moroccan immigrants in Selva, Catalonia,
on grounds of financing the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL).140 In 2015 and 2016,
the CITCO identified some 300 people being investigated for both drug
trafficking and terrorism.141 The CNI’s counterintelligence activities led to the
discovery and expulsion of a double agent in 2007, and, in 2016, of an officer
alleged to be maintaining strong connections with the Moroccan intelligence
agencies or radical Islamists.142 The enhanced background check and
intelligence collection capabilities of CITCO and other agencies has led to the
identification and exclusion of terrorists and organized criminals among
asylum-seekers from the European relocation program.143
While the IC’s effectiveness has improved at a rapid pace, democratic
civilian control over the Spanish intelligence system has lagged. To be sure,
the executive branch has stepped up its guidance, direction, and prioritization
of intelligence affairs, especially after the implementation of the Intelligence
Directive. Interagency coordination also has improved and deserves
recognition. But legislative control and oversight remain deficient. In the
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aftermath of the 3/11 terrorist incident, the legislative committee that had
been established to investigate Spanish intelligence operations prior to the
attack was perceived as a failure. The committee could not reach an
agreement on what had prevented the intelligence services from averting 3/11,
let alone providing recommendations regarding to ensure that such attacks
would not happen again.144
The relentless political infighting and mutual blame among members of
the two main parties comprising the committee (the Socialist Party and the
Popular Party) made an investigation virtually impossible.145 The situation
was better with regard to the Civil Guard, which had less contact with the
politicians, and was, therefore, less prone to corruption or politicization.146
In addition, the committee members had nearly no access to information,
partly due to their lack of expertise (for example, not knowing which
documents to request or which questions to ask), and partly due to the
refusal by the Ministry of Defense to declassify and share information with
the legislators.147 Researchers indicate that even in the late 2010s, legislative
control and oversight continues to be challenged by secrecy, lack of interest,
and limited expertise in intelligence.148
However, a more recent success in legislative oversight (as well as judicial
control) deserves accolades. In 2016, the National High Court approved the
declassification of all CNI documents related to the alleged “CIA flights” that
purportedly transported to Spain by the Central Intelligence Agency several
terrorism suspects who had been illegally detained during the Global War on
Terror.149 This decision was double-edged. While beneficial for the purposes
of transparency, having brought about the declassification of documents and
fostered more and broader discussion of Spanish intelligence, it raised
questions of ethics, damaged the reputation of the Spanish intelligence
agencies, weakened public trust, and, perhaps most sensitively, focused on
infringement of human rights, when, for example, the Council of Europe
scolded all countries that had supported the CIA by allowing its flights to
land and providing “black sites” where its prisoners were held after being
“renditioned.”
As in the past, the country’s media—equally sensationalist and mindful of
its role in advancing Spanish democracy—continue to complement the formal
oversight mechanisms of intelligence. The media remain alert and expose
wrongdoing, which ultimately brings about responsive government. On 14
April 2009, for example, the El Mundo daily alleged that then-CNI Director
Alberto Saiz had used public funds for personal purposes (hunting and
fishing). This investigation then led to the discovery of the director’s
additional unlawful acts. including nepotism, misapplication of funds, and
mismanagement of the agency.150 These revelations came while Saiz’s tenure
as director was up for renewal, a matter greatly opposed by highly ranked
CNI personnel who sought his removal and even filed a formal complaint
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against him.151 On 3 July 2009, Saiz resigned and was replaced by a four-star
general, F!elix Sanz Rold!an.152
Similarly, in 2016, the media revealed that the office of former Minister of
Interior Fern!andez D!ıaz had been tapped.153 Of particular interest was Diaz’s
conversation with Daniel de Alfonso, Chief of Catalonia’s Counter Fraud
Office, in which they discussed which mechanisms could be used to
substantiate alleged corruption cases against Catalonian nationalists. While
the particulars of this development remain unclear, the Socialist Party
requested an Investigation Committee at the Spanish Congress. The
procedure for learning how and who recorded Fern!andez D!ıaz was due to
start in February 2017, when the Parliament began its 2017 session.154
Within the context of transparency, the intelligence culture has continued
to thrive. In 2005, the CNI launched an Intelligence Culture Initiative,
whereby the CNI partnered with several Spanish universities, including the
Rey Juan Carlos University, Madrid; the Carlos III University, Madrid;
and the University of Barcelona.155 This Initiative sought to make
intelligence an academic discipline, and to allow intelligence professionals
to capitalize on scholarly knowledge.156 This effort culminated four years
later, when Rey Juan Carlos and Carlos III universities, in collaboration
with the CNI, launched graduate programs in intelligence, the first ever in
Spain.157 The Intelligence Culture Initiative has fostered scores of seminars,
conferences, and workshops, for both intelligence insiders and outsiders.158
In 2006, Intelligence and Security: Journal of Analysis and Foresight
appeared; it was Spain’s first intelligence academic journal.159 These
endeavors resulted in a “growing interest in intelligence and Intelligence
Studies from academics, students, business, and departments from the
Spanish government; a growing number of seminars, workshops, and
programs organized by universities; … an increasing demand by companies
for people trained in intelligence analysis; a growing body of intelligence
literature in Spanish; development of several research projects on
intelligence.”160
The 2016 launching of Routledge’s International Journal of Intelligence,
Security, and Public Affairs, edited by scholars from the Rey Juan Carlos
University and Cadiz University, amply demonstrated Spanish academia’s
determination to “disseminate original academic and professional articles on
matters related to intelligence applied to security, defense, business and the
financial-economic environment.”161
This careful development of an intelligence culture has helped counter the
public’s distaste for intelligence, and replaced it with a new confidence in
the institutions and agencies that form Spain’s IC. Perhaps the clearest
demonstration of this dramatic change in perceptions is the thousands of
applications that the CNI now receives annually,162 along with the significant
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amount of information the agencies receive from the public on potential
terrorist plots or organized crime activities.
The Ethics Gap
Still, neither the rising, if uneven, public interest in intelligence affairs nor the
rising intelligence culture has led to a sufficiently determined effort to tackle
the issue of ethics and ethical codes. While significant scholarly work has
emerged elsewhere on the subject, the topic has attracted only modest
attention at academic conferences and virtually none from policymakers.163
The IC, despite its developing democratic professional ethos, has itself been
relatively quiet about ethics. For example, the CNI’s activities and personnel
follow a Code of Ethics that enables the Center to fulfill its service to the
nation through upholding such values as loyalty, sacrifice, discretion,
authority, and leadership.164 This code is based largely on the military’s Code
of Ethics which promotes such traditional military values as rectitude,
sacrifice, secrecy, objectivity and impartiality, companionship, authority, and
leadership very much along the lines of the Royal Ordinances of the Armed
Forces (Royal Decree No. 96/2009), especially those of Articles 26–48.165
While many of these values apply to the intelligence community and comport
with larger social expectations, the unfiltered transmission of military values
ill suits the civilian agencies’ mission or makeup, where, for example,
obedience or rank tend to operate differently.
The gap is both startling and completely understandable in a post-
authoritarian polity which demands transparency and accountability from its
agencies of state and government but also wants to avoid having to pay
sustained attention to the government sectors, however reformed, that
previously wielded the powers of oppression. The result is a potentially
significant realm of intelligence action that remains ungoverned or only
loosely inflected by a robust and democratic code of ethics. The danger, then,
is not just more scandal and overreach, but a new or worsening stigma, poor
recruitment or retention of the best and brightest personnel, dwindling
financial resources, increasingly formidable legal or operational prohibitions,
and further estrangement from democratic society—the “vicious circle” of
intelligence–civilian relations at every step of the intelligence cycle.166 In such
circumstances, a reduction in Spain’s intelligence effectiveness is not hard
to imagine.
ANALYSIS OF THE INTELLIGENCE REFORMS: CONTROL AND
EFFECTIVENESS
Despite several challenges and obstacles—some still present—Spain has
progressed significantly in democratizing its intelligence since the end of
Franco r!egime in 1975.
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In light of these reforms and the further development of Spain’s IC, we
have rated it as medium for control and medium-high for effectiveness,
utilizing metrics developed by Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana
Matei.167 We assigned low values for a lack of implementation of any of the
metrics/requirements; medium values for inconsistent attempts to implement
the metrics; and high values for full implementation and discussion for
further improvement.
A summary of findings, in terms of requirements for civilian control and
requirements for effectiveness is presented in Table 1. Values ranging from
“low” to “high” were assigned for each requirement.
Requirements for Control
Spain scores “high” in the Institutional Control Mechanisms category. Since
the end of the Franco regime, Spain’s civilian elites have developed several
control mechanisms for intelligence, including the enactment of a robust
intelligence-related legal framework, creation of civilian-led institutions (such
as the CNI and the police), as well as providing strategic guidance and
prioritization of intelligence roles and missions. NATO and EU requirements
and regulations, along with the security context, have acted as catalysts for
these institutional developments.
In the “Oversight” category, Spain scores “medium.” The country’s
policymakers have established formal oversight mechanisms, such as the
Intelligence Oversight Committee and appropriate judicial bodies, that very
recently became more interested and more effective in performing their
oversight roles. Nevertheless, these oversight units tend to be reactive to
whatever “fire alarms” the media sounds, rather than proactively monitoring
the intelligence agencies. In contrast, the informal oversight performed by the
media has been frequently credited for advancing intelligence reforms. They
have often exposed misconduct in intelligence or lack of actual reform, which
then compelled the formal oversight mechanisms to investigate transgressions,
punish wrongdoing, and bring about real reforms.
Spain scores “medium-high” in the Professional Norms category. Its
civilian elites have sought to develop professional intelligence agencies, based
on expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. They have successfully
achieved the expertise and institutional requirements of a “profession,” in the







Norms Plan or Strategy Institutions Resources
Value High Medium Medium-High High High Medium-High
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sense propounded by Samuel Huntington, namely through recruitment,
education, training, and career development.168 The internal aspects of the
intelligence culture bear favorably on this progress, as well.
Still, an ethical requirement for the profession has yet to be fully
elaborated. The legacy of the past, coupled with deficient ethical rules and
regulations, is both a symptom and a cause.
Requirements for Effectiveness
Spain scores “high” in the “Plan” category. Policymakers have developed
several successive strategic documents since the transition to democracy,
including a robust plan on the role and place of intelligence in the democracy.
Noteworthy is the recent Intelligence Doctrine that sets the IC’s priorities and
guidelines, as well providing its resources.
Spain scores “medium-high” in the “Institutions” category. After a rocky
start, Madrid’s policymakers have slowly brought about an intelligence
community of several agencies, some civilian and some military, working
together to safeguard Spain’s security and democracy. Increasingly, the
country experiences effective coordination mechanisms among its own
intelligence agencies, healthy cooperation and sharing with allied agencies,
and interoperability. Though some bureaucratic challenges persist, and turf
battles have challenged coordination and cooperation, these are now isolated
incidents rather than institutional routine.
Spain scores “medium-high” in the “Resources” category. Not until the
2000s, with the advent of terrorism as a global threat, did Spanish
policymakers started to assign more resources to intelligence, in terms of
budget, personnel, and equipment. The CNI augmented its budget in
September 2015 by 7.7 percent, up to 240 million euros.169
A WORTHWHILE ENDEAVOR
Institutionalizing the democratic reform of intelligence in Spain has been a
strenuous, yet ultimately successful, process. Contemporary Spanish
intelligence agencies are both effective and under democratic civilian control.
The balance weighs more on the “effectiveness” side. To level the balance,
policymakers must press for—and practice—more effective formal oversight
and a more rigorous code of ethics for intelligence.
Paradoxically, despite the nation’s burgeoning intelligence culture, Spain’s
greater society seems passive toward intelligence oversight or ethics, and does
not pressure the government for more involvement or engagement with the
IC. Meanwhile, the political opposition seems uninterested in establishing
such safeguards because they apparently look forward to engaging in the
same old skullduggery when they take power.170 In this context, Spanish
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intelligence ethics are susceptible to a “vicious cycle” pattern, with real
implications for the country and its intelligence agencies.171 All levels of
Spanish society, inside and outside the IC, will need to maintain the
momentum and progress of democratic intelligence reform, particularly as
regards genuine oversight and institutional ethics.
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